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INTRODUCTION 
In The River Runs Dry:  When Title VI Trumps State Anti–Affirmative 
Action Laws,1 Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon has identified a tension 
between state anti–affirmative action laws and the continued enroll-
ment of minority students in public universities.  The tension is not 
surprising, because the voter initiatives that led to those state anti–
affirmative action laws were transparently motivated by white majorita-
rian desires to reduce minority student enrollment in public universi-
ties.  What is surprising, however, is Professor West-Faulcon’s sugges-
tion that state anti–affirmative action laws can themselves be read to 
permit precisely the type of race-conscious affirmative action that they 
might initially be thought to prohibit.2 
Capitalizing on the self-interested desires of states to avoid federal-
funding cutoffs, Professor West-Faulcon constructs an argument that 
is both analytically sound and enticingly clever.  However, that does 
not mean that the argument is free from a potentially fatal flaw.  The 
problem is that doctrinal arguments alone cannot compel adherence 
 
* © 2009 by Girardeau A. Spann. 
† Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry:  When Title VI Trumps State Anti-
Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075 (2009). 
2 See id. at 1083-84, 1155-58 (asserting that the “federal-funding exceptions” con-
tained in state anti-affirmative action laws may allow states to defend race-conscious 
admissions policies). 
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to policies that are sufficiently unpopular to mobilize effective politi-
cal opposition.  Alternate doctrinal arguments can always be devel-
oped that are cogent enough to support the outcomes favored by so-
cially powerful opponents, and the original argument can always be 
marginalized to the point where its analytical soundness ceases to ap-
pear particularly relevant. 
This problem creates a dilemma for those of us who are tempted 
to formulate doctrinal arguments as a means of advancing our own 
racial-equality agendas.  Participation in a syllogistic game that pur-
ports to be governed by doctrinal rules but actually uses those rules 
simply to mask the dispositive role of political preferences runs the 
risk of reinforcing the authenticity of the game itself.  But declining 
participation in the game precludes the possibility of securing even 
those occasional victories that are permitted in order to convey the 
impression that the game is legitimate.  It is difficult to see how the di-
lemma can ever be satisfactorily resolved.  However, the loss of inno-
cence entailed in recognizing this doctrinal dilemma may, at least, 
constitute a step in the right direction. 
I.  DOCTRINE 
In the mid-1990s, political opponents of affirmative action began 
using ballot-initiative measures to secure the enactment of state anti–
affirmative action laws.3  Although supporters typically typically 
framed the laws as antidiscrimination measures, and never actually 
mentioned the term “affirmative action,” the intended effects in-
cluded a reduction of minority enrollment in public colleges and uni-
versities that had previously been obtained through affirmative action 
programs.4  However, the anti–affirmative action laws also included 
what Professor West-Faulcon calls “federal-funding exceptions,” which 
explicitly stated that the laws did not prohibit actions necessary to 
maintain eligibility for federal-funding programs.5  Professor West-
Faulcon believes that those federal-funding exceptions preclude a 
reading of the anti–affirmative action laws that would violate the pro-
hibition on disparate impact discrimination contained in Title VI of 
 
3 See id. at 1087-90 (discussing California’s Proposition 209, Washington’s Initiative 
200, Michigan’s Proposal 2, and Nebraska’s Initiative 424). 
4 See id. at 1087 & n.31, 1091 (“State anti-affirmative action laws are the product of 
a political and legal campaign to end state-sponsored affirmative action.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
5 Id. at 1092 & n.49 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e); MICH. CONST. art. I, 
§ 26(4); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30(5); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400(6) (2008)). 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6  Her argument is so elegant that it is fun 
just to recite it. 
Professor West-Faulcon argues that public colleges and universi-
ties have responded to state anti–affirmative action laws by eliminating 
the affirmative action programs that they used to select students for 
admission.7  As a result, minority enrollment in those schools has de-
clined in ways that are statistically significant enough to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination prohibited by Title 
VI.8  A showing of some “educational necessity” justifying use of the 
selection criteria producing a racially disparate impact can rebut a 
prima facie Title VI violation.9  However, no such showing justifies the 
declines in minority enrollment that have been produced in response 
to state antidiscrimination laws.  Those declines were produced by 
continued heavy reliance on applicant SAT scores, though those 
scores do not correlate highly enough with student success in college 
to warrant the racially disparate impact that they produce.10  Rather, 
the schools’ use of SAT scores is motivated more by a desire to en-
hance the institutional prestige and financial bond ratings of those 
schools than to serve as an accurate predictor of student success.11  
Unlike SAT scores, high-school grades do have a high correlation with 
college success,12 and they do not produce the same racially disparate 
impact that SAT scores do.13  Accordingly, reliance on high-school 
grades as an admission criterion would constitute a less discriminatory 
alternative to the continued use of SAT scores.  One cannot say, there-
fore, that continued use of SAT scores constitutes an educational ne-
cessity within the meaning of Title VI.14 
Others have argued that the use of selection criteria that produce 
a racially disparate impact is inconsistent with statutes such as Title VI 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because those statutes 
 
6 See id. at 1084 (“[U]niversities may invoke the federal-funding exception to de-
fend the readoption of race-conscious admissions policies as legally permissible under 
their state’s anti-affirmative action laws.”). 
7 Id. at 1086, 1090-93, 1119-20. 
8 Id. at 1092-1102. 
9 Id. at 1129 n.192 (citing Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 n.6 
(9th Cir. 1984)). 
10 Id. at 1120-44. 
11 Id. at 1105-09. 
12 Id. at 1115. 
13 Id. at 1127, 1128 & n.189. 
14 Id. at 1128. 
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view disparate impact as a form of prohibited discrimination.15  Profes-
sor West-Faulcon, however, adds a new twist to this argument.  She ar-
gues that the inclusion of federal-funding exceptions in each of the 
new state anti–affirmative action laws controls the way that those state 
laws must be interpreted and implemented.16  Because one of the re-
medies for a disparate impact violation of Title VI is the very loss of 
federal funds that the state affirmative action laws explicitly seek to 
prevent, the use of race-conscious selection criteria motivated by a de-
sire to avoid federal-funding cutoffs cannot constitute a violation of 
those anti–affirmative action laws.  Instead, it constitutes the remedial 
use of race, rather than the prohibited use of race as a discriminatory 
preference.17  Any other reading of state anti–affirmative action laws 
runs the risk of “normaliz[ing]” lower minority admissions.18  As a re-
sult of Professor West-Faulcon’s doctrinal sleight of hand, state anti–
affirmative action laws end up requiring the very sorts of race-conscious 
affirmative action that they might superficially have been thought to 
prohibit.  This is impressive doctrinal reasoning.  But there is a problem. 
II.  PROBLEM 
As cogent as Professor West-Faulcon’s doctrinal argument is, it is 
difficult to imagine that the argument could meaningfully change the 
attitudes or behavior of affirmative action opponents who currently 
believe that state anti–affirmative action laws compel a reduction in 
minority student enrollment.  The problem is not that Professor West-
Faulcon’s doctrinal argument is in any way deficient.  The problem is 
that doctrine itself is typically unable to overcome strongly motivated 
political opposition—especially with respect to the issue of race. 
It is possible to evade Professor West-Faulcon’s conclusion that 
state anti–affirmative action laws actually permit race-conscious re-
 
15 See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:  Round Three, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 506-08, 577-85 (2003) (tracing the development of the Title VII 
prohibition on disparate impact discrimination and invoking the expressive content of 
the statute to support the constitutionality of the prohibition under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1494-1501 (1997) (proposing the creation of a new doctrine, “inten-
tional impact theory,” through which “a party could combine evidence of an industry 
or profession’s discriminatory intent in adopting or developing certain selection stan-
dards with current evidence of disproportionate impact, to create a prima facie case” 
under Title VI). 
16 West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1084. 
17 Id. at 1145-58. 
18 Id. at 1158. 
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medial admissions by challenging some of the doctrinal assumptions 
on which her conclusion rests.  Professor West-Faulcon’s interpreta-
tion of state anti–affirmative action laws depends on her interpreta-
tion of Title VI as a federal-funding-based prohibition on the dispa-
rate impact that would result from reducing minority student 
enrollment in order to comply with state anti–affirmative action laws.  
Title VI, however, might not be offended by such disparate impact.  
Professor West-Faulcon herself admits that reliance on the SAT scores 
that produce this disparate impact might serve as the educational-
necessity justification that would preclude the need for any Title VI 
disparate impact funding cutoff.19 
Professor West-Faulcon argues that SAT scores cannot constitute 
an educational necessity, because high-school grades are a better pre-
dictor of college success than are SAT scores, and the former do not 
produce the disparate impact generated by the use of the latter.20  Her 
argument, however, assumes that the pursuit of enhanced prestige 
and financial bond ratings is not a legitimate interest sufficiently 
compelling to qualify as an educational necessity under Title VI.  Al-
though Professor West-Faulcon does consider the possibility that pres-
tige and bond ratings might constitute an educational necessity, her 
rejection of that argument might be too dismissive.21 
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the University of Michi-
gan Law School’s affirmative action plan in Grutter v. Bollinger seems to 
recognize that the pursuit of educational prestige is a compelling in-
terest.22  As Justice Thomas convincingly pointed out, the majority’s 
decision to uphold the law school’s affirmative action plan can best be 
understood as endorsing the pursuit of educational elitism.23  That is 
 
19 See id. at 1124-26 (conceding that even if “the use of the SAT as an admissions 
criterion has a racially discriminatory effect,” Title VI is not violated if “the SAT is ne-
cessary to ensure that minority applicants have the requisite college performance abili-
ty”). 
20 Id. at 1127-28. 
21 See id. at 1127 (“[I]t is unclear whether . . . the SAT’s rankings- and prestige-
enhancing value . . . would suffice as an educational necessity . . . .”). 
22 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-30 (2003) (holding that the pursuit of 
diversity in higher education can constitute a compelling governmental interest under 
strict scrutiny applied to racial classifications, and acknowledging deference to educa-
tional institutions’ “educational judgment”). 
23 See id. at 354-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he 
Court upholds the use of racial discrimination as a tool to advance the Law School’s 
interest in offering a marginally superior education while maintaining an elite institu-
tion.”); see also Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 
236-37 (2004) (exploring Justice Thomas’s claim that “the [Grutter] Court’s real inter-
est is in protecting elitism”). 
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precisely because the law school could have relied on the less discri-
minatory alternative of pursuing student diversity through the aban-
donment of LSAT scores if it were willing to incur a potential loss of 
prestige.24  In holding that the affirmative action plan survived strict 
scrutiny, therefore, the Grutter majority was necessarily holding that 
the pursuit of prestige did constitute a compelling state interest. 
Professor West-Faulcon goes on to argue that school reliance on 
SAT scores to predict college success is unnecessary because the mar-
ginal increase in predictive value that SAT scores add to high-school 
grades is too small to warrant the disparate impact that the use of SAT 
scores produces.25  In reaching that conclusion, however, Professor 
West-Faulcon assumes that “[t]he key factual question is whether re-
liance on the SAT is necessary to ensure that minority applicants have 
the requisite college performance ability to attend certain selective 
public universities in states with anti–affirmative action laws.”26  But 
that need not be the key question.  It seems quite legitimate for a 
school to rely on admissions criteria designed not simply to identify 
qualified students but also to identify the best students in the applicant 
pool.  If that is the goal, the marginal increase in predictive value pro-
vided by SAT scores may, in fact, be sufficient to constitute a Title VI 
educational necessity.  Indeed, it is not clear why merely being quali-
fied would ever alone be sufficient for admission in a selective student-
ranking environment, where the goal is to admit the best students.27 
Professor West-Faulcon has rejected Professor Eugene Volokh’s 
interpretation of the federal-funding exception contained in state an-
ti–affirmative action laws, but it is not clear what is wrong with Profes-
sor Volokh’s interpretation.  Based on the statutory language “must be 
taken,” Professor Volokh views the federal-funding exception as apply-
ing only when race-conscious affirmative action is absolutely necessary 
 
24 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367-71 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (discussing alternatives to the use of the LSAT for admissions). 
25 West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1126. 
26 Id. 
27 I note—with admiration rather than criticism—that Professor West-Faulcon 
seems to shift her emphasis from “best” to “qualified” as necessary to strengthen her 
argument.  See, e.g., id. at 1154 (arguing that if “the primary interest of a selective pub-
lic university is to admit the best and brightest high-school students based on their aca-
demic merit without regard to race, [SAT] test deficienc[ies] unfairly undermine[] 
that goal” because of their “racially discriminatory effect on African American and La-
tino applicants with the requisite college performance ability to attend the institution” (em-
phasis added)).  
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to maintain federal funding.28  Under this view, if some race-neutral 
alternative way of maintaining federal funding is available, then affir-
mative action is not permitted under state anti–affirmative action laws.  
Professor West-Faulcon rejects this argument because she believes it 
would deprive the exception of any practical effect.29  Schools could 
never be certain that a court would find that all conceivable race-
neutral alternatives were literally unavailable, so schools would be un-
willing to risk voluntary race-conscious remedial action because that 
action might later be held invalid under state anti–affirmative action 
laws.30  Professor West-Faulcon, therefore, prefers to borrow the 
strong-basis-in-evidence standard from the Supreme Court’s affirma-
tive action cases—a standard under which schools would be free to 
engage in voluntary, race-conscious remedial action if they had a 
strong basis in evidence for thinking that the failure to take such ac-
tion would constitute a Title VI disparate impact violation.31 
Professor West-Faulcon’s argument makes intuitive sense.  But 
Professor Volokh’s position is arguably more consistent with the idea 
of strict scrutiny, which is customarily applied to racial classifications.  
Strict scrutiny imposes the heavy burden of proving the existence of a 
compelling state interest and a narrowly tailored means for advancing 
that interest,32 which is consistent with Professor Volokh’s literalistic 
view of state anti–affirmative action laws.  It is also worth noting that 
even though the Supreme Court has used the strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard under strict scrutiny in some of its constitutional affirmative 
action race cases, the Court has never found that standard to be satis-
fied.33  And even the intuitive appeal of Professor West-Faulcon’s ar-
gument now seems to have been largely overtaken by a new develop-
ment.  Since her article was published in the spring of 2009, the 
 
28 See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative:  An Interpretive Guide, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1387 (1997) (“If it’s possible to be eligible without the discrimina-
tion, then the discrimination is prohibited, because it’s not true that the action ‘must 
be taken’ for eligibility.”). 
29 West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1157-58. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1148-57 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)). 
32 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2752 (2007) (discussing strict scrutiny for racial classifications). 
33 The only two cases in which a racial classification has survived strict scrutiny are 
the now-discredited Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld a 
World War II exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese Americans, and 
the more recent Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which upheld the University 
of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan as a narrowly tailored means of ad-
vancing a compelling interest in student diversity.  Neither case considered the appli-
cation of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard for remedial affirmative action. 
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Supreme Court has decided a new Title VII case that seems to offer 
renewed support to the Volokh interpretation. 
In Ricci v. DeStefano, decided June 29, 2009, the Supreme Court 
invalidated New Haven’s refusal to certify the results of a firefighter 
promotion exam that had an adverse, racially disparate impact on mi-
nority firefighters.34  Even though the city’s actions were motivated by 
a desire to avoid a Title VII disparate impact violation, the Court held 
that the city’s race-conscious actions constituted a Title VII intention-
al-discrimination violation that adversely affected the mostly white 
firefighters who outscored minorities on the exam.35  As Professor 
West-Faulcon suggested in the context of Title VI, the Ricci Court ex-
tended the strong-basis-in-evidence standard that it had previously 
used in constitutional affirmative action cases to Title VII disparate 
impact claims.36  But the Ricci majority’s application of that standard 
was so strained that Justice Ginsburg emphasized in dissent that it was 
difficult to see how the Court’s new incarnation of the standard could 
ever be satisfied in the absence of an actual adjudication of a disparate 
impact violation.37  The Ricci majority was so hostile to the continued 
recognition of disparate impact claims that it expressly left open the 
question of whether the Title VII disparate impact provision was itself 
unconstitutional.38  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia even sug-
gested that he had already made up his mind that the Title VII dispa-
rate impact provision violated the Constitution.39  In light of Ricci, it is 
difficult to imagine the current Supreme Court accepting Professor 
West-Faulcon’s argument that federal funds would have to be cut off if 
state anti–affirmative action laws produced a racially disparate impact 
in student enrollment.  It would be difficult to distinguish a school’s 
voluntary effort to avoid a disparate impact on students from New Ha-
ven’s voluntary effort to avoid a disparate impact on firefighters.  In 
fact, it seems more likely that the current anti–affirmative action ma-
jority on the Supreme Court would hold unconstitutional any reading 
of Title VI that compelled such a result, in the same way that it has 
 
34 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (2009). 
35 Id. at 2664. 
36 See id. at 2664-65, 2675-77 (“[W]e adopt the strong-basis-in-evidence standard as 
a matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII.”). 
37 Id. at 2700-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 2676 (majority opinion). 
39 Id. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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threatened to hold the disparate impact provision of Title VII uncons-
titutional.40 
Finally, the “four-fifths rule” that Professor West-Faulcon favors for 
establishing a prima facie case of Title VI disparate impact41 seems to 
be in tension with the Grutter Court’s aversion to quotas, mathematical 
ratios, and racial balancing.42  Moreover, the Ricci Court gave short 
shrift to the EEOC interpretive guideline that would have insulated 
New Haven’s efforts to prevent disparate impact from Title VII liabili-
ty.43  It is true that the Grutter Court deferred to the “educational 
judgment” of educational institutions in determining the degree to 
which racial affirmative action was educationally desirable.44  But it is 
precisely that judgment that the voters chose to override when they 
passed their state anti–affirmative action ballot initiatives. 
III.  DILEMMA 
Personally, I find Professor West-Faulcon’s argument more persu-
asive than my suggested evasions of her argument.  But that is because 
I already agree with her conclusion.  I believe that state anti–
affirmative action laws actually constitute a recent incarnation of the 
longstanding commitment to the sacrifice of racial-minority interests 
for the benefit of the white majority in the United States.  From sla-
very and the genocide of indigenous Indians to Japanese-American in-
ternment and the current resegregation of public schools, United 
States society has always found ways to discriminate against racial mi-
norities when it wished to do so.45  For me, the colorblind race neu-
trality that state anti–affirmative action laws purport to restore is simp-
ly a technique for freezing an unequal baseline in the distribution of 
 
40 In recent decades, the Court has expressed unmistakable hostility to racial af-
firmative action.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205-09, 
226, 235-37 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a federal-funding program containing 
an affirmative action preference for minority contractors).  The preference was ulti-
mately abandoned on remand.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 
106 (2001). 
41 West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1120-23, 1128-30. 
42 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330, 334 (2003) (“To be narrowly tailored, 
a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system . . . .”); cf. Gratz v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003) (invalidating the University of Michigan’s under-
graduate affirmative action plan, which mechanically awarded points to minority ap-
plicants).  
43 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2699-2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the EEOC 
interpretive guidelines and the majority’s lack of deference to those guidelines). 
44 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33. 
45 See Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 565, 591-92, 
597-607 (2008). 
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societal resources that was produced by a long history of discrimina-
tion.46  Further, the distinction between merit and the reverse-
discrimination racial preferences that anti–affirmative action laws 
purport to end is simply a smokescreen designed to make continued 
white majoritarian discrimination appear legitimate.47  I know that 
Professor West-Faulcon is aware of these structural arguments, be-
cause she cites them in her article.48  But she chose not to emphasize 
them, presumably because her Title VI doctrinal argument would 
have more credibility if it could not be dismissed as yet another sys-
temic “societal discrimination” claim whose validity the Supreme 
Court refuses to recognize.49  And therein lies the problem. 
Doctrine does not matter much when outcomes are predeter-
mined by political or ideological beliefs.  If the Supreme Court were 
to construe the meaning of the federal-funding exception to state an-
ti–affirmative action laws—or were to rule on the constitutionality of 
those laws themselves—the outcome would be determined more by 
the Court’s personnel and the prevailing political climate than by any 
controlling doctrinal imperative.  Everyone knows this to be true.  And 
yet we continue to formulate carefully crafted doctrinal arguments, as 
 
46 See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 190-92, 241-70 (1997). 
47 See Roithmayr, supra note 15, at 1469-81 (“Far from being the opposite of ‘bias,’ 
the concept of merit is necessarily inscribed with subjective, status-based social bias, 
which merit sought to exclude in the first place.”). 
48 See e.g., West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1082 n.15 (citing Roithmayr, supra note 
15, at 1473-81); id. at 1087 n.31 (citing Spann, supra note 46, at 189). 
49 This prohibition on the use of legal remedies to redress general societal dis-
crimination as opposed to identifiable acts of particularized discrimination was articu-
lated by Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 307-10 (1978), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 476 U.S. 267, 274-78 (1986) (plurality opinion).  Led by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, this view has now been adopted by a majority of the Court.  See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 323-25 (stating that Bakke “rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimi-
nation”); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (requiring “identified discrimina-
tion” to justify a government’s use of racial distinctions under the Equal Protection 
Clause (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 
547, 610-14 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has long recog-
nized the government’s interest in remedying identified discrimination); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989) (plurality opinion) (same); John-
son v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-53 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (rejecting “societal discrimination” as a justification for affirmative action 
under Title VII); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] govern-
mental agency’s interest in remedying ‘societal’ discrimination, that is, discrimination 
not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass con-
stitutional muster under strict scrutiny.”). 
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if syllogistic analysis were likely to determine outcomes rather than 
merely the opinions issued to rationalize those outcomes. 
Those of us who wish to use law as a means of promoting racial 
justice therefore confront a serious dilemma.  If we continue to make 
doctrinal arguments, knowing that those arguments are unlikely to 
determine outcomes, we simply reinforce the legitimacy of a social sys-
tem that uses law and adjudication as one of its tools for the contin-
ued oppression of racial minorities.  But if we stop participating in the 
process of doctrinal adjudication, we risk losing those sporadic con-
cessions that even an oppressive social system must occasionally make 
to those whom it oppresses in an effort to prevent bottled-up frustra-
tions from ripening into serious threats of destabilizing change. 
CONCLUSION 
It might be that when racial minorities seek to advance their in-
terests from a position of political weakness, all that they can realisti-
cally hope for are the intermittent concessions that the white majority 
permits to trickle down.  If that is true, racial minorities ought at least 
to understand that this is what is going on.  Doctrinal arguments can 
then be viewed as an available form of political action, rather than as 
proof that the white majority can trick racial minorities into falling for 
the legitimacy of a system that gets minorities to participate willingly 
in their own oppression.  But continued minority participation in doc-
trinal analysis without this level of self-awareness may prove to be as 
pathetic as it has been effective. 
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